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LEIBNIZ AND THE POLITICAL THEOLOGY OF THE CHINESE 
Eric S. Nelson (Hong Kong) 
In this paper, I reconsider the ethical-political and political theological contexts of 
Leibniz’s reception and interpretation of Chinese political culture and thought. This 
study examines Leibniz’s political philosophy and ‘political theology’ in order to 
clarify how he interpreted the Chinese political system and Confucian political 
thought as providing a model of benevolent enlightened kingship rooted in natural 
theology in the context of the early Enlightenment. This approach – articulated with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm in thinkers such as Leibniz, Wolff, Bilfinger, and 
Voltaire – would in the later and post-Enlightenment period—in thinkers such as 
Herder, Kant, and Hegel – become an instance of the abuses of absolute power and 
represent the obedience and heteronomy of the ancien régime as much as of the 
‘Orient’. The Western idea of China as an ahistorical and timeless regime of 
‘Oriental despotism’ developed in earlier thinker such as Montesquieu and was 
subsequently shaped by disputes over the appropriate relationship between politics 
and religion and enlightened monarchy and popular self-determination during the 
long eighteenth-century.  
I. INTRODUCTION1 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) was born during the chaotic era of the 
concluding years of the Thirty Years’ War. The political and religious conflicts of 
his epoch that devastated central Europe have been used to explain his sensibility 
that aimed at philosophical, political, and religious accommodation and reconcilia-
tion. Leibniz’s polymathic synthesizing efforts at reconciling diverse elements have 
led interpreters to highlight different tendencies in his project. Leibniz practical 
thought has been portrayed as conservative and as reformist, as oriented toward 
 
1  The research in this paper was supported by General Research Fund 16631916: The Political 
Theology of the Chinese in Early Modern European Philosophy / 早期歐洲現代哲學中的“中
國政治神學”. Note that this chapter incorporates elements from and relies in part on the inter-
pretation of Leibniz’s political philosophy summarized in E. S. Nelson: “Leibniz, Gottfried 
Wilhelm (1646–1716)”, in: M. Gibbons (ed.): The Encyclopedia of Political Thought, Oxford 
2015, pp. 2098–2100. 
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conserving the threatened past and toward furthering the development of enlighten-
ment, modernity, and progress that threatened that heritage2. Rather than represent-
ing or embodying a disjunction between the ancients and the moderns, in which 
Leibniz must be categorized as belonging to either one camp or the other, Leibniz 
would be more appropriately interpreted as both a conservative and reformer. He 
simultaneously hearkens back to the pre-modern wisdom of the ancients while pur-
suing a modernizing philosophical and practical project. 
This complex configuration of the ‘simultaneity’ of tradition and reform is 
characteristic not only of Leibniz’s practical philosophy. It also arguably describes 
an intellectual figure, and the tradition associated with his name, which fascinated 
Leibniz and other early Enlightenment intellectuals3. These include – with different 
degrees of enthusiasm – Leibniz, Wolff, Bilfinger, Diderot and Voltaire. The figure 
of Confucius (Kongzi 孔子) has seen multiple incompatible interpretive avatars in 
modern Western thought from a superstitious pagan and simplistic moralist to a 
reactionary founder of Oriental despotism to a figure of enlightened morally ori-
ented political rule guided by tradition and reform insofar as both embody ethical 
ideals. Unlike Bayle, Montesquieu, and Malebranche, or later Herder, Kant, and 
Hegel, Leibniz’s reception of Confucian China belongs to the more positive appro-
priation of Chinese thought and culture4. Leibniz’s engagement on behalf of Chi-
nese and Confucian ethics and politics resonates with his own ethical and political 
thought. 
Leibniz was able through the circuitous transmission of Chinese thought from 
East to West through the Jesuit missionaries and others to develop his own analysis 
of its significance. He detected affinities between his own thought and that of an 
alien and distant Chinese cultural and intellectual tradition. This sentiment is not 
completely inappropriate. The early Ruist 儒家 (Confucian) thinkers were born into 
a period of war and its quest for stability – whether it is rooted in the moral nature 
of human beings (Mengzi 孟子)  or externally imposed through effort by a strict 
and rigorous moral-political order (Xunzi 荀子) – has been interpreted as a response 
to the reality of conflict and instability.  
Leibniz described his endeavors as preserving and redeeming the wisdom of 
the ancients – which had fallen into disrepute after the development of the new 
sciences, mathematics, and philosophy – in accord with the innovations in 
knowledge and practice of the present. The dispute between the ancients and the 
moderns in modern European philosophy, which Leibniz attempted to resolve, is 
repeated in modern European reception of Chinese philosophy and religion. The 
 
2  These two perspectives are respectively agued in P. Riley: Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence: 
Justice as the Charity of the Wise, Cambridge 1996; and R. Berkowitz: The Gift of Science: 
Leibniz and the Modern Legal Tradition, Cambridge 2005. 
3  On Confucius and China in the Enlightenment, see W. W. Davis: “China, the Confucian ideal, 
and the European Age of Enlightenment”, in: Journal of the History of Ideas 44/4 (1983), pp. 
523–54; S. Kow: China in Early Enlightenment Political Thought, Abingdon 2017. 
4  W. Li/H. Poser: “Leibniz’s Positive View of China”, in: Journal of Chinese Philosophy 33/1 
(2006), pp. 17–33. 
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legitimacy of contemporary Chinese thought and culture is not only evaluated ac-
cording to internal Western standards but also according to the Western – in partic-
ular the Jesuit – reconstruction of the wisdom of the ancient Chinese that attempted 
to identify and contrast it with Jewish and Greek wisdom. 
In this context, Confucius is perceived to be concurrently an inheritor of the 
past and an Enlightened reformer of the present for his early Enlightenment advo-
cates. Confucius has been characterized as both a traditionalist and an innovator: a 
scholar who projects an innovative ethical model into the past to morally educate 
and reform the crisis-ridden present or who looks at the past in order to reform and 
renew the present.  
One paradox of interpreting Leibniz’s and the early Enlightenment’s reception 
of Confucian political thought is the problem of Enlightened absolutism. Leibniz 
was a persistent opponent of political absolutism, including Enlightened 
absolutism, in his writings concerning political philosophy and current European 
politics. He explicitly and repeatedly advocated the plurality and mediation of 
powers, defending the Holy Roman empire against its absolutist critics such as – in 
the German setting – Samuel Pufendorf who Leibniz dismissed as a “man who is a 
small jurist and a very small philosopher”5. However, early modern European 
enthusiasm for Chinese political thought and culture is often considered a correlate 
not of the mediation of powers promoted by Leibniz but of Enlightened despotism 
that legitimated the modern centralized absolutist monarchies that Leibniz opposed. 
The model of benevolent enlightened kingship rooted in natural theology (in 
Leibniz’s language) and practical philosophy (in Wolff’s language) unfolded in the 
interpretation of China in Leibniz, Wolff, and Voltaire would in the later 
Enlightenment – in thinkers such as Kant, Herder, and Hegel – become a model of 
the abuses of absolute power and the obedience of the ancien régime as much as 
the ‘Orient’. The Western idea of China as a regime embodying the ‘Oriental 
despotism’ of ‘total power’ harkens back to earlier thinkers such as Montesquieu, 
who contended that the Chinese conflated law and custom (i.e., the political and the 
social) and was governed by a despotic unitary regime akin to ancient Sparta, while 
being shaped during the long eighteenth-century by disputes over the appropriate 
relationship between politics and religion and enlightened kingship and popular 
self-determination6. This problem can be resolved in the case of Leibniz by properly 
understanding both the plurality of powers and the function of an enlightened ruler.  
 
5  “Vir parum jurisconsultus, minime philosophus”. A VI, 3, 261. Citation from M. Dascal: The 
Practice of Reason: Leibniz and his Controversies, Philadelphia 2010, p. 250. 
6  “One must not be astonished if the legislators of Lacedaemonia and those of China confused 
laws, mores, and manners; this is because mores represent laws, and manners represent mores”. 
C. d. S Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws, Cambridge 1989, p. 317. Montesquieu also 
claimed in the Spirit of the Laws that there were an “infinite number of people in Japan and 
China” because they subsisted primarily on oily fish. Ibid., p. 435. 
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II. AGAINST ORIENTAL DESPOTISM: THE POLITICAL THEOLOGY OF 
THE CHINESE IN THE NOVISSIMA SINICA 
Leibnizʼs attention to the Chinese moral and political system as a potentially 
superior model that can instruct and help reform the way of life and institutions of 
the West is expressed in his Novissima Sinica (Latest News from China, 1697; 2ed. 
1699). In this early sustained discussion of China, which thematized the distance 
and complementary of the two extremes of the Eurasian continent, Leibniz stressed 
how civil precepts and laws, as well as the hedge of customs and the network of 
obligations in the subsequent passage, are coordinated to achieve the best possible 
equilibrium of society: 
But who would have believed that there is on earth a people who, though we are in our view so 
very advanced in every branch of behavior, still surpass us in comprehending the precepts of 
civil life? Yet now we find this to be so among the Chinese, as we learn to know them better. 
And so if we are their equals in the industrial arts, and ahead of them in contemplative sciences, 
certainly they surpass us (though it is almost shameful to confess this) in practical philosophy, 
that is, in the precepts of ethics and politics adapted to the present life and use of mortals. 
Indeed, it is difficult to describe how beautifully all the laws of the Chinese, in contrast to those 
of other peoples, are directed to the achievement of public tranquility and the establishment of 
social order, so that men shall be disrupted in their relations as little as possible7. 
How is such a harmonious adaptive equilibrium possible? On the one hand, human 
relations are left to themselves with less intervention and interference in them than 
in Europe. On the other hand, this self-ordering is possible because of a deeply-
ingrained system of interconnected customs, duties, and feelings of duty and respect 
that form a functional whole. Leibniz described in the next passage of the Novissima 
how to Europeans, who are  
not enough accustomed to act by reason and rule, these [practices] smack of servitude; yet 
among [the Chinese], where these duties are made natural by use, they are observed gladly8. 
The Chinese, Leibniz claimed, have achieved a higher social niveau in which 
obedience and reverence have become the practiced norms of society and negative 
social affects, such as “hatred, wrath, or excitement,” have been tempered and 
brought under control9. 
The deployment on words such as obedience in these passages might suggest 
the idea of a despotitic subordination of inferiors to superiors, of the weak to the 
the powerful, the young to the old, and females to males. Herder would near the end 
of the eighteenth-century in his Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Humanity 
(1784), contrasting European freedoms with Oriental oppression, interpret such 
 
7  G. W. Leibniz: Novissima Sinica, § 3, in: Id.: Writings on China, trans. D. J. Cook/H. Rose-
mont, Jr., La Salle 1994, p. 45. See A IV, 6, Nr. 61, 396. 
8  Ibid., p. 46; Novissima Sinica, § 4; A IV, 6. 
9  Ibid. 
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facets of Chinese social life as an unnatural and static order of unreflective childlike 
obedience to despotic power10.  
It is noteworthy that Leibniz has an alternative conception that does not rely, as 
Herder and Hegel would, on the opposition of the natural and the artifical and the 
pre-reflective customary and merely reflexive with the self-consciously reflective. 
He is not describing the imposition of an artificial external Leviathan-like power 
onto the powerless undifferentiated equal masses in which only one, namely, the 
Emperor, is free as Hegel would assert in the Lectures on the Philosophy of 
History11. In this construction of an image of total power: “everything derives solely 
from the emperor”12. The interpretations of Herder and Hegel would play a 
significant part in the evolution of the Oriental despotism thesis that has dominated 
modern Western thinking about China and became a Western influence on modern 
Chinese anti-democratic thinking. 
Leibniz focuses on the customary and rational self-regulating character of – a 
no doubt idealized portrayal – Chinese society. The Novissima suggests the moral 
self-organization and, what could be well described as, the autonomy that 
characterizes a proper equilibrium and harmony in which the parts coordinate 
through internal (e.g., customs, habits, and dispositions) as well as external (e.g., 
laws) reasons and mechanisms. The coordination of Chinese society is a practical 
exemplar of the harmonious balance and mediation of different powers in Leibniz 
in contrast with Hegel’s portrait of the arbitrary, bureaucratic, and unjust imposition 
of domination from above13. 
Leibniz’s understanding of Chinese society is of a morally and normatively 
guided self-ordering system in which tranquility and order are achieved through the 
activities and participation of members of society with their own social agency and 
roles. Social participation in roles reaches its high-point in the Emperor who is not 
above or external to Chinese moral-political life: 
Who indeed does not marvel at the monarch of such an empire? His grandeur almost exceeds 
human stature, and he is held by some to be a mortal god. His very nod is obeyed. Yet he is 
educated according to custom in virtue and wisdom and rules his subjects with an extraordinary 
respect for the laws and with a reverence for the advice of wise men. Endowed with such 
eminence he seems fit indeed to judge. Nor is it easy to find anything worthier of note than the 
fact that this greatest of kings, who possesses such complete authority in his own day, anxiously 
fears posterity and is in greater dread of the judgment of history, than other kings are of 
representatives of estates and parliaments. Therefore he carefully seeks to avoid actions which 
 
10  J. G. Herder: Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit. Werke in zehn Bänden, 
vol. 6, Frankfurt a. M. 1985, pp. 436–437. 
11  G. W. F. Hegel: Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, vol. 1, Oxford 2011, pp. 226–
232. 
12  Ibid., p. 230. 
13  Ibid., p. 232. 
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might cast a reflection upon his reputation when recorded by the chroniclers of his reign and 
placed in files and secret archives14. 
The Chinese emperor has powers akin to an earthly god, and an authority and height 
that demands his command be obeyed. He can set masses of humans into motion. 
This description could be used to support the idea of the Oriental despot, who has 
unlimited arbitrary power over all and duties and responsibilities to none, as seen 
in Hegel’s claim that in the Orient “only one is free”15. Despite his own emphasis 
in his practical philosophy on the self-organization of the community in ethical life 
and the political system of the state, Hegel did not recognize the moral self-
organization of the community and the mediation of powers at play in Chinese 
society. Hegel interprets Chinese life as dominated by external despotic and 
bureaucratic powers, and Western (in particular, German) social life as the 
achievement of freedom. 
Leibniz, however, focuses on the delimited role of the Chinese monarch and 
how this role shapes and limits political power: his account gives the ruler both 
power and responsibility for the use of that power in a way that corelates with 
Confucian moral-political philosophy. In this conception, the ruler ought to be 
educated in virtue, wisdom, and respect for the laws and act in view of them; that 
is to say, reign according to the good instead of an arbitrary voluntarist will and 
pure power. The ruler is evaluated by the internalized standards maintained in 
Confucian practical philosophy, fears the judgment of the sages and history, and 
thus appropriately (according to the Confucian notion of yi 義) fulfills his role and 
mandate.  
Leibniz asks his readers to construe the ritual reverence for Confucius, the 
monarch, and the ancestors to be primarily political rather than religious16. 
Leibniz’s description of the Chinese political system accords with his own political 
philosophy and, as we will see later, his political theology that can identify Chinese 
moral principles with natural theology while distinguishing between civil-political 
and religious cults. These two claims distance the essence – if not the present reality 
– of Chinese political theology from charges of paganism as well as irreligious 
atheism, materialism, and Spinozism17. 
 
14  Leibniz: Writings on China, p. 47; Novissima Sinica, § 6; A IV, 6, N. 61, p. 398. On this passage 
and Leibniz’s particular enthusiasm for the Kangxi (康熙) Emperor  (r. 1661–1722), compare 
F. Perkins: Leibniz and China: A Commerce of Light, Cambridge 2004, p. 128. 
15  Hegel: Lectures, p. 87. 
16  Leibniz: Writings on China, p. 59; De cultu Confucii civili, § 3; A IV, 8, N. 70, p. 395: «In 
Cultu quem Sinenses exhibent Confutio et aliis defunctis bene meritis, majoribusque inprimis 
suis; apparet adhiberi quae religiosa alias apud plurimos habentur. Sed constat valde aequivoca 
esse pleraque haec Signa, usque adeo ut adoratio alicubi cultus sit politicus et ipsum nomen 
divinitatis usurparint imperatores etiam Christiani.” 
17  Leibniz repeatedly opposed atheistic and materialist interpretations of Chinese thought, at least 
in its ancient and essential form, maintaining in his correspondence with Des Bosses that these 
interpretations: “were so far from succeeding in this that, instead, all the contrary propositions 
seem to me most probable. In fact, the ancient Chinese more than the philosophers of Greece 
seem to have come near to the truth, and they seem to have taught that matter itself is the 
production of God”. Leibniz to Des Bosses, 13 January 1716; G. W. Leibniz: The Leibniz – 
 Leibniz and the Political Theology of the Chinese 7 
 
The Chinese monarch has more power, no doubt, than the ruler of the Holy 
Roman Empire; both, however, are given roles and responsibilities. These are 
limited by the customary and rationally justified sense and scope of that role. The 
Chinese ruler is accordingly not the pure despot of the Oriental despotism thesis in 
Leibniz’s description.This thesis found inspiration in Montesquieu and gained 
prominence over the Enlightenment period as European attitudes toward China 
became increasingly more negative. 
Leibniz had his own account of political despotism and we can distinguish what 
actual despotic power looked like for him. He portrayed Louis XIV. of France as 
despotic in his polemical political writings and rejected political absolutism in his 
critiques of Pufendorf and Hobbes. Pufendorf commented about the Chinese: 
The Readiness of the Chinese to obey their King blindly, does but confirm his Tyranny and 
encrease their Misery. For those, who depend on the Will of one Man, subject to a Thousand 
Passions, whose, Fancies can be restrainʼd by no Law, can be sure of Nothing18. 
But, conspicuously, the Chinese ruler was not a tyrant like the French sun-king in 
Leibniz’s Chinese writings. There were elements, such as the description of 
authority and command, which could be employed in line with the Oriental 
despotism thesis. The title of this section is anachronistic. The Western conception 
of Oriental despotism had earlier incarnations in thinkers such as Montesquieu and 
Pufendorf developed into its full modern form that encompassed West, South, and 
East Asia in distinction from Europe after Leibniz19. 
Leibniz offered, in contrast to Montesquieu and Pufendorf, an alterantive 
arguably more nuanced interpretation of the roles of appropriate authority and 
responsibility in Chinese practical life that recognized the interconnections between 
power and responsibility. The Confucian statement from the Analects (Lunyu 論語
) 12.19 that ‘as the wind blows, the grass must bend’ (cao shang zhi feng bi yan 草
上之風必偃) is ambiguous: it is a statement of the exemplary influence of moral 
governance that could be construed as the assertion of power. These two 
possibilities of a morally guided politics and a regime of absolute power are evident 
in modern European interpretations of Chinese moral-political life.  
 
Des Bosses Correspondence, transl., ed., and with an introduction by B. C. Look/D. Rutherford, 
New Haven 2007, p. 359; see GP II, 508. 
18  S. Pufendorf: Law of Nature and Nations, London 1716, p. 285. 
19  An early contrast between European freedom and “Oriental despotism” in German thought, 
which has sources in Greek conceptions of the Persians and more recently in Montesquieu’s 
portrait of Muslim and Eastern empires, was made by Johann Georg Meusel in his 1776 work 
Der Geschichtforscher, Partes 3–4, Halle, p. 239. On the role of Herder’s interpretation of 
China and its relation to Montesquieu and Hegel, see G. Zöller: “‘[D]er Name Confucius ist 
mir ein grosser Name’. Herders politisch-geschichtsphilosophische China-Deutung zwischen 
Montesquieu und Hegel”, in: D. Hüning/G. Stiening/V. Stolz (eds.): Herder und die klassische 
Deutsche Philosophie, Stuttgart 2016. 
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III. LEIBNIZ AS A POLITICAL THINKER 
To understand the connections between Leibniz’s political philosophy and his 
interpretation of the practical philosophy of the Chinese, we need to contextualize 
his political philosophy and its relationship with his understanding of China.  
Leibniz’s political philosophy has been underappreciated in the reception of his 
thought. The young Leibniz studied law and then spent his adult life in the 
diplomatic and political service of nobility and royalty, particularly the House of 
Hanover that assumed the British crown a few years before his death. He is most 
familiar for his writings on metaphysics, mathematics, and logic to such an extent 
that there are Leibniz scholars who maintain that “there is no explicit political 
philosophy in Leibniz”20. Leibniz’s wide-ranging political correspondence and 
writings concerned the foundations of law, local and international political affairs 
and social problems, and moral and political philosophy. 
The youthful Leibniz’s practical interests and reformist inclinations led him to 
decline an academic career in the university and into the service of the archbishop 
and elector of Mainz21. From his service in Mainz to Hanover, Leibniz was an ad-
vocate of legal reforms, the reconciliation of conflicting Catholic and Protestant 
parties within the empire and Europe, and the practical defense and theoretical jus-
tification of the Holy Roman Empire with its loose federation of non-identical di-
verse overlapping and intersecting powers22. This diversity of powers included in-
tellectually informed advisors, like himself, who might be compared with the ad-
ministratively active Confucian literati. This plurality of distinct overlapping 
spheres and centers of powers was condemned as ‘irregular’ and ‘monstrous’ (mon-
stro simile) by Pufendorf and justified by Leibniz as a check on absolute power. In 
a series of polemical (sometimes witty) writings, Leibniz challenged the internal 
centralization and the external expansionism of the absolutist French monarch, who 
he called the ‘Most Christian War-God’, Louis XIV.23. 
Leibniz criticized the vision of absolute unified sovereignty maintained by 
Hobbes and Pufendorf in his more theoretically oriented political writings. Leibniz 
had ambivalent views throughout his career of early modern thinkers of sovereign 
power such as Hobbes and Pufendorf. Leibniz recognized the strengths of Hobbes’ 
rationalizing method even as he critiqued it for reviving Thrasymachus’s position 
in Plato’s Republic that justice is the interest of the stronger power and upholding 
a political-theological voluntarism that reduced the justice and goodness of God to 
an arbitrary political despotism motivated by fear that is unworthy of the dignity of 
 
20  See Philip Wiener’s remark in his introduction to G. W. Leibniz: Selections, ed. and trans. by 
Ph. P. Wiener, New York 1951, p. xlviii. 
21  See M. R. Antognazza: Leibniz: An Intellectual Biography, Cambridge 2009, p. 79. 
22  P. Riley: “Three 17th century German theorists of federalism: Althusius, Hugo and Leibniz”, 
in: Publius 6/3 (1976), pp. 7–41. 
23  G. W. Leibniz: Political Writings, ed. by P. Riley, Cambridge 1988, pp. 121–145. See also A 
IV, 2, N. 22. 
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the divine. God cannot be forced to choose the good, but does so through rational 
freedom.24 
Recent interpreters of Leibniz have accentuated either: (1) his backward 
looking traditionalism in striving for a morally oriented and religiously informed 
legal and political philosophy25 or (2) his progressive modernism in applying the 
paradigm of the new mathematical sciences to law and politics so that, despite his 
own intentions, he becomes a primary source for the reduction of legal thinking to 
the positivistic scientific model of legal scientism and positivism26. Both of these 
readings capture signiifcant dimensions of his thought; but they are inadequate to 
the extent that Leibniz is neither a pure traditional natural law theorist nor 
modernizing positivist. Leibniz’s efforts – beginning with his early juridical works 
– endeavor to preserve by reforming traditional conceptions of ethics, law, and 
politics through their modernistic rationalization. Leibniz’s practical philosophy 
encompasses and remains beholden to Pauline Christian, Roman legal, Reformation 
Aristotelian, and classical Platonic sources, amongst others. It is this synthetic 
configuration of the ancient and the modern that shapes Leibniz’s encounter with 
Chinese culture. 
IV. ETHICAL IDEALS AND POLITICAL REALITIES 
Leibniz’s conception of reason, which he claims is embodied in Enlightened 
political systems such as Chinese society27, implies that normative reasoning about 
ends guides instrumental rational calculations about means. There is less of a 
bifurcation between the ethical-normative and the prudential-instrumental in 
Leibniz’s practical philosophy than found in Kant’s moral thinking.28 This 
emphasis on continuity between degrees of variation is evident beginning with 
Leibniz’s early legal writings that analyze how positive civil law stems from natural 
law thatoffers both grounds of justification and norms that guide social-political 
reform and renewal. The language of roman legal thinking and Pauline Christian 
charity cannot merely serve as a conservative rhetoric for Leibniz; they were 
 
24  Cf. G. W. Leibniz: Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the 
Origin of Evil, ed. and with an introduction by A. Farrer, transl. by E. M. Huggard, La Salle 
1985, p. 59; “Our end is to banish from men the false ideas that represent God to them as an 
absolute prince employing a despotic power, unfitted to be loved and unworthy of being loved. 
These notions are the more evil in relation to God inasmuch as the essence of piety is not only 
to fear him but also to love him above all things”, ibid., p. 127. 25  Cf. Riley: Leibniz’ 
Universal Jurisprudence. 
25  Cf. Riley: Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence. 
26  Cf. Berkowitz: The Gift of Science. 
27  Leibniz: Writings on China, p. 45; Novissima Sinica, § 6. A IV, 6, 398. 
28  On the prudential and instrumental in Kant’s practical philosophy, see E. S. Nelson: “Moral 
and Political Prudence in Kant”, in: International Philosophical Quarterly 44/3 (2004), pp. 
305–319. 
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sources of his project of enlightened reform and social policy through the use and 
extension of reason. 
Leibniz applied his practical conception of reason, with all the presuppositions 
that this has for him, to the implicit rationality at work in Chinese practical 
philosophy in the Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese (1715–1716). 
It is interesting to note the difference between Leibniz and Nicolas Malebranche. 
Both thinkers upheld the idea of the universal character and scope of reason that all 
peoples share, such that a Christian philosopher could rationally convince a Chinese 
philosopher through argumentation in Malebranche’s Dialogue Between a 
Christian Philosopher and a Chinese Philosopher on the Existence and Nature of 
God (1708), while they differed on the issue of the legitmacy of Chinese thought29. 
Leibniz’s stress on the continuity between diverse levels of thinking and charity in 
interpretation marks one crucial difference. Another difference is Leibniz’s 
description of Chinese philosophy in light of Western categories of reason and a 
natural theology that unites the religious and the political:  
What we call the light of reason in man, they call commandment and law of Heaven. What we 
call the inner satisfaction of obeying justice and our fear of acting contrary to it, all this is called 
by the Chinese (and by us as well) inspirations sent by the Xangti [Shangdi 上帝] (that is, by 
the true God). To offend Heaven is to act against reason, to ask pardon of Heaven is to reform 
oneself and to make a sincere return in word and deed in the submission one owes to this very 
law of reason. For me I find all this quite excellent and quite in accord with natural theology. 
Far from finding any distorted understanding here, I believe that it is only by strained 
interpretations and by interpolations that one could find anything to criticize on this point. It is 
pure Christianity, insofar as it renews the natural law inscribed in our hearts—except for what 
revelation and grace add to it to improve our nature.30 
The practical and political achievements of the Chinese, which Leibniz suggests 
can be an example and model to reform the practical and political life of the 
Occident, is interconnected with the purity of the insights of Chinese natural 
theology that only needs Christian revelation to perfect itself. In this sense, we can 
describe Leibniz’s interpretation as ‘political-theological’ It depends on a 
rationalized and moralized account of Christianity and the relation between religion 
and politics. 
The interdependence of the religious and political spheres is not accidental nor 
merely an instrumental concern for Leibniz in his political and Chinese writings. 
Politics is thought in relationship to political theology, political and religious prin-
ciples express one another, and pragmatic political concerns of general well-being 
in these texts. Based on his pragmatic understanding of political affairs, Leibniz 
 
29  N. Malebranche: Dialogue between a Christian philosopher and a Chinese philosopher on the 
existence and nature of God, Washington D.C. 1980. Malebranche also retained the Medieval 
idea of ‘natural reason’ in humanity. He maintained that the Chinese have the same capacity 
for reason and impulse toward happiness as Europeans, and therefore can be converted to Chris-
tianity through rational philosophical argumentation. On the relation between these two inter-
pretations of China, compare G. M. Reihman: “Malebrancheʼs Influence on Leibnizʼs Writings 
on China”, Philosophy East and West 65/3 (2015), pp. 846–868. 
30  Leibniz: Writings on China, p. 104; Discours sur la théologie naturelle des Chinois, § 31. 
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recommended that we “imagine things at their worst in politics” while “imagining 
things at their best in morality.”31 Leibniz applies this maxim and pragmatic con-
cern in his list of areas where Europe surpasses China. Passivism – which he asso-
ciates with the overly ‘Christian’ attitude of the Chinese in this passage – permits 
evil to flourish and the good to be undone: The Chinese 
also yield to us in military science, not so much out of ignorance as by deliberation. For they 
despise everything which creates or nourishes ferocity in men, and almost in emulation of the 
higher teachings of Christ (and not, as some wrongly suggest, because of anxiety), they are 
averse to war. They would be wise indeed if they were alone in the world. But as things are, it 
comes back to this, that even the good must cultivate the arts of war, so that the evil may not 
gain power over everything32. 
The Chinese have to this extent failed in Leibniz’s estimation to properly mediate 
the higher religious and lower prudential teachings necessary for maintaining so-
cial-political life. Granted that Leibniz might appear to be committed to thinking of 
the political through the dualistic extremes of a pragmatic and calculative self-in-
terested realism and an idealistic image of altruistic charity for others inspired by 
Saint Paul and Saint Augustine, he emphasized their political theological mutuality 
and the moral direction of political policy and action in his writings and correspond-
ence. Leibniz articulated the possibility of reconciling the ethical and the prudential 
in an ethically oriented politics in his portrayals of justice as the charity of the wise 
(caritas sapientis), as a philosophically enlightened love (agapê), and as a universal 
benevolence informed by prudence so that mere power and evil will not win33. This 
mediation of morality and knowledge is the basis for his applied utilitarian ‘science 
of felicity’ (scientia felicitates) that ought to orient and guide enlightened morally 
oriented pragmatic policies. The Chinese political system guided by Confucian lit-
erati provided an exemplary model of a philosophically oriented politics. 
Leibniz was an advocate of limited monarchy, arguing for the diversity of pow-
ers as a way to restrict abuses of authority. This political stance appears to be in 
conflict with the image of the Enlightened despot. Accordingly, as we saw above, 
Leibniz deploys his own political sensibility to define and limit the potentially ex-
cessive power of the Chinese monarch. One essential limit is the perspective and 
judgment of the Confucian literati intellectuals who mediate the Emperor’s power 
through the administration of scholar-bureaucrats. The literati form a sort of critical 
 
31  Id.: Political Writings, p. 81. 
32  Leibniz: Writings on China, p. 45; Novissima Sinica, § 2. A IV, 6, 395. 
33  Leibniz appeals to Paul’s conception of love while reintegrating it with knowledge in contrast 
with Paul’s skeptical remark that: “Knowledge puffs up; love builds up” (Gnôsis phusioi, agapê 
oikodomei). 1 Corinthians, 8,1. Leibniz describes his ideal of charity and how piety is only 
possible in charity in the Theodicy: “Our charity is humble and full of moderation, it presumes 
not to domineer; attentive alike to our own faults and to the talents of others, we are inclined to 
criticize our own actions and to excuse and vindicate those of others. We must work out our 
own perfection and do wrong to no man. There is no piety where there is not charity; and 
without being kindly and beneficent one cannot show sincere religion”. Leibniz: Theodicy, p. 
52. 
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public that can philosophically and pragmatically guide the polity. Notions of pub-
licity and accountability are constitutive of Leibniz’s interpretation of political au-
thority, and these elements are not lacking in his account of the responsibility and 
scope of the Chinese monarch and its Confucian literati ‘philosophical’ administra-
tors. 
V. LEIBNIZ’S PLATONIC CONFUCIANISM 
Leibniz maintained the priority of the wise in governing (the philosophical mon-
arch) and the role of divine providence in human affairs, both of which have in his 
interpretation Chinese political-theological correlates: the sage-king (shengren 聖
人) and ‘will of heaven’ (tianzhi 天志)34. From his Platonizing perspective, Leibniz 
rejected John Locke’s social contract theory, including the principle of equal natural 
rights, and appealed to providence in order to justify obedience to de facto regimes 
in his interpretation of William Sherlock’s Case of Allegiance35. Leibniz’s position 
here has its Chinese correlates in the Confucian interpretation and hierarchical rank-
ing of social and familial roles and ‘heaven’s will’ as expressing the moral and 
natural order of the world. Leibniz’s interpretation of the idea of a Confucian sage-
ruler is informed by his prudentially mediated Platonic-Pauline conception of be-
nevolent political wisdom as much as by actual Chinese moral and political sources. 
In contrast to Kant’s radical differentiation of pure practical reason (ethics) and 
pragmatic prudence, Leibniz upheld the eudaemonist dimension of the political that 
aims at general well-being. He articulated the bonds between one’s own self-inter-
ested happiness and the happiness of others, as ends for their own sake, in addition 
to the general good and common welfare of society, humanity, and God’s creation. 
This line of argumentation led him to assert the continuity between human justice 
and divine justice (theodicy), agreeing with Plato in the Meno that the divine – ra-
tionally and spontaneously – follows the good rather than the good being posited 
through the will36. 
Leibniz maintained the acceptance of de facto authority while rejecting conflat-
ing such authority with the principle of justice. He argued against both legal posi-
tivism, which conflates actual force and positive laws with justice, as well as vol-
untarism, which prioritizes the capricious arbitrary will and coercive power of 
 
34  I would like to express my thanks to Axel Rüdiger for pointing out the importance of the Uto-
pian elements in Leibniz’s interpretation of China and earlier European thinkers who noted 
affinities between the Confucian sage ruler and the Platonic philosopher-king, including Michel 
de Montaigne, Georg Hornius, and Isaac Vossius. 
35  This text has been consequently construed as ‘Hobbesian’, despite its different providential 
rationale for accepting the existing regime as legitimate. 
36  Leibniz: Political Writings, p. 45; also compare G. Grua: Jurisprudence Universelle et Théod-
icée selon Leibniz, New York 1985. 
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worldly kings and God. Legal positivism and practical voluntarism reduce the po-
litical to the relativism of the rightness of power37; and they undermine possibilities 
of criticism and complaint that are the prerequisites of enlightened reform38. Belief 
in the primacy of the will and coercive power independent of reasons necessarily 
undermines goodness and justice39. Freedom is constitutive of morality, and free-
dom naturally and rationally tends toward that which is best: the good. Leibniz con-
cluded in a Platonic vein that even God’s will – and hence correspondingly the 
Chinese idea of the will of heaven – must follows the good that is the object of 
divine understanding and, furthermore, that there is a ‘common conception of jus-
tice’ (i.e., the good) that orients both humans and God40. God and heaven are not 
irrational powers; they key aspects of the rational order of nature and of rational 
knowledge of that order41. 
In the Chinese context, the common principle of justice extends between 
heaven, humans, and earth. The Platonic priority of the good is visible for Leibniz 
in the Neo-Confucian account of patterning principle, form, or coherence (li 理). Li 
was one of the candidates for a Chinese correlate to the Christian idea of God in the 
discussions of the Jesuits and Leibniz. Leibniz glosses li as ‘spirit.’ Leibniz’s read-
ing of li is Platonic. He takes patterning principle (li) to be the good. He understands 
the principle of li to assert the priority and unity (theoretical and practical) of reason. 
This approach was mediated by the early Jesuit reception of Neo-Confucianism that 
was shaped by its more rationalist form (lixue 理学) associated with Zhu Xi 朱熹. 
Leibniz adopts an eclectic Platonic strategy in his discussion of li in Annota-
tiones de Cultur Religioneque Sinensium (Remarks on Chinese Rites and Religion) 
in 1708, noting how: “From the li, taken in itself, emanates justice, wisdom and the 
other virtues […]”42. Whereas the normative world originates in li in itself, the ma-
terial world stems from modified li linked and intermixed with qi 氣. Li in and of 
itself, defined as harmony and justice, is essentially rational and normative. Li is 
imperfectly realized and expressed in the rational order of the natural world. In the 
Neo-Confucian framework, and ultimately in the end for Leibniz who emphasizes 
gradations of continuity in contrast to Kant’s strategy of conceptual separation, the 
categories of the normative and the political cannot be separated from the categories 
of the cosmological and the theological. 
According to Leibniz, the universe challenges us with questions of its harmony 
and justice. These questions echo and have their correlates in Chinese traditions as 
well. Leibniz’s nominal definition of justice is: “a constant will to act in such a way 
 
37  On the relationship between power and right in Leibniz, compare H. Schiedermair: Das Phäno-
men der Macht und die Idee des Rechts bei Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Wiesbaden 1970. 
38  Leibniz: Political Writings, pp. 47–48. 
39  Id.: Theodicy, p. 59.  
40  Ibid., p. 94; id.: Political Writings, pp. 45–64. 
41  The most careful and comprehensive account of the rational order of nature in Leibniz is D. 
Rutherford: Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, Cambridge 1998. 
42  Leibniz: Writings on China, p. 67; Annotationes de Cultur Religioneque Sinensium, § 1; GP II, 
380. 
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that no one has reason to complain”43. This point is clarified in his account of the 
degrees of justice that ascend from the legal to the ethical and then to the religious, 
which emerged in his earlier interpretations of the Roman legal tradition and Paul-
ine charity44. Leibniz differentiated three practical spheres: (1) the legal is the min-
imal negative duty to harm no one (the ‘strict right’ of commutative justice based 
in self-interest); (2) the ethical is the positive duty to ‘give each his due’ and act 
with charity for the sake of others (the equity or distributive justice oriented by 
concern for others and general welfare); and (3) the religious is to live honestly or 
piously for its own sake (the universal justice and divine republic of God and hu-
mans)45. 
Leibniz commented in the Theodicy:  
The true God is always the same: natural religion itself demands that he be essentially as good 
and wise as he is powerful. It is scarcely more contrary to reason and piety to say that God acts 
without cognition, than to maintain that he has cognition which does not find the eternal rules 
of goodness and of justice among its objects, or again to say that he has a will such as heeds 
not these rules46.  
Leibniz’s conception of justice is best indicated in pure or philosophically inter-
preted Christianity. Yet, as natural theology, Leibniz finds the inspiration of ‘the 
true God’ at work in Chinese moral and political practices and ideas, which as nat-
ural (political) theology express a form of ‘pure Christianity’ or the ‘charity of the 
wise’47. Confucian benevolence (ren 仁) is an expression of the compassion of the 
philosopher habitualized and institutionalized in social-political life.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Leibniz often appears to rediscover, as in a reflection, his own conception of ethics 
and political theology in his response to Chinese practical philosophy. He no doubt 
at times dreamed of converting the Chinese to his own philosophical vision of pure 
natural theology rather than the impure Christianity that dominated European soci-
ety and that the missionaries sought to transmit to China. It remains an open ques-
tion to what extent Leibniz’s encounter with China modified his thinking though it 
cannot be said to have radically altered it. 
Leibniz’s ethical principle of charity was adopted into an interpretive strategy 
of normatively oriented charity that is noticeable in the way he wishes his readers 
to interpret Chinese sources48. He points towards ways of uncovering the rationality 
 
43  Id.: Political Writings, p. 53. 
44  H.-P. Schneider: Justitia universalis Quellenstudien zur Geschichte des “Christlichen Natur-
rechts” bei Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Frankfurt a. M. 1967. 
45  Leibniz: Political Writings, pp. 171–172. 
46  Id.: Theodicy, p. 238.  
47  Leibniz: Writings on China, p. 104; Discours sur la théologie naturelle des Chinois, § 31. 
48  I develop this account of the hermeneutical character of Leibniz’s interpretation of China fur-
ther in E. S. Nelson: “Leibniz and China: Religion, Hermeneutics, and Enlightenment”, in: 
Religion in the Age of Enlightenment, 1 (2009), pp. 277–300. 
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in Chinese discourse despite its distance and foreignness to Europeans. Leibniz’s 
attempt to articulate the intrinsic meaningfulness and rationality of other perspec-
tives in his approach to China remains fairly remarkable in the primarily Eurocen-
tric history of modern Western philosophy. It continues to be suggestive for con-
temporary intercultural thinking even if he offers an insufficient hermeneutical 
model for it. 
Leibniz’s theoretical and practical, ideal and pragmatic, political thinking are 
not discontinuous; they converged in his humanistic and cosmopolitan vision that 
is reflected in his diverse practical and theoretical efforts at peace and reconciliation 
between distinct and conflicting forms of life and philosophical perspectives. A 
number of his writings in practical philosophy and his diplomatic and intellectual 
correspondence concerned tolerance, compromise, and coming to an agreement 
across political, religious, scientific, and cultural disputes and distances from the 
Holy Roman Empire and Europe to Peter the Great’s Russia and the far East49. 
Leibniz’s writings concerning China exemplify, as this chapter has illustrated, these 
broader concerns. 
 
49  See ibid. and id.: “The Yijing and Philosophy: From Leibniz to Derrida”, in: Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy 38/3 (2011), pp. 377–396. 
